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LHCA and workmen's compensation benefits have not been suffi-
cient to meet the costs of these accidents. As a result, the excess
costs have been borne by the state in the form of increased services
to the injured worker and his dependents. The court's interpretation
of article 2322 and its opinion in general illustrate its belief that the
Louisiana Civil Code provides ample authority for passing on these
costs to the heretofore practically immune, platform-owning oil com-
panies. The decision, though strained in some respects,76 prop-
erly reflects a notion of "enterprise liability," a "determination that
the entity that causes risk to the public through some enterprise
should be responsible for the damage caused by the enterprise so
that the cost of the damage will be allocated as an expense of the
enterprise.""T
Rand Dennis
THE END OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN LOUISIANA:
Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation
Plaintiff Welch, an employee of Austin Carpenter, was injured
while on the land of defendant, Crown Zellerbach. In his first suit
for workman's compensation benefits, plaintiff sought recovery from
both Carpenter and Robert Campbell, Inc., alleging that his
employer was the subcontractor of the latter. The court of appeal held
that such a relationship had not been established.' Plaintiffs subse-
quent litigation against Crown Zellerbach depended upon the status
of Robert Campbell, Inc. as plaintiff's statutory employer, which
status could only be established by proving the Carpenter-Campbell
subcontract and that Campbell was, in turn, the subcontractor of
defendant. Crown Zellerbach prayed for dismissal of the suit, argu-
ing that since the subcontractor/contractor relationship between
Carpenter and Robert Campbell, Inc. necessary to hold Crown
Zellerbach liable had been found nonexistent in the prior litigation,
the plaintiff was estopped to relitigate the issue. The lower court
agreed with this argument and dismissed the suit. The supreme
court reversed and held, inter alia, that the collateral estoppel doc-
trine of issue preclusion does not obtain in Louisiana. Welch v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978).
75. See 365 So. 2d at 1296 (Marcus, J. & Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
76. 365 So. 2d at 1291 n.13.
1. See note 31, infra.
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In Louisiana, the effect of a prior judgment on a present suit is
governed by Civil Code article 2286. The article itself, which is iden-
tical to article 1351 of the French Civil Code, speaks in terms of the
"thing adjudged," stating that the "authority of the thing adjudged"
will apply only as to the object of the judgment. The article then
lists the criteria used to determine whether that application will be
made.' There must be identity of the parties, the cause, and the
thing demanded. Any effect which a prior judgment may have on a
subsequent suit must be determined according to the provisions of
this article. Thus, if a party in a suit enters a peremptory exception
based on the preclusive effect of article 2286, and it is determined
that the three identities are met, further litigation on that claim is
not permitted.
In the common law, the analogous process by which the effect of
a prior judgment on a subsequent suit is determined is embodied in
the concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata is a
doctrine of claim preclusion and refers to the effect of a prior judg-
ment in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same
cause of action.' The application of this doctrine accomplishes two
separate effects: merger and bar. Thus, when the plaintiff obtains a
judgment, his claim that was successfully prosecuted is merged into
the judgment and has no identity apart from it. Alternatively, if the
defendant wins, the plaintiff is barred from further prosecution of
his unsuccessful claim.' The doctrine of res judicata is supplemented
by the common law "might have been pleaded" rule, which requires
a party to assert in a suit all claims or defenses in support of or
against the cause of action.' Thus, through the application of the
"might have been pleaded" rule, the common law maintains a very
strict version of claim preclusion: the plaintiff is given only one
chance to plead his cause of action against the defendant, and the
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2286 provides:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was
the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the demand
must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be between the
same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same quality.
3. The jurisprudence has consistently held that article 2286 is to be strictly con-
strued. See, e.g., Olsen Eng'r Corp. v. Hudson Eng'r Corp., 289 So. 2d 346, 349 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1973); Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173, 175 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973);
Lege v. United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 186 So. 2d 670, 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
4. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); F. JAMES, CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE § 11.9 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41-44 (1942).
5. See Kotsopoulos v. Austuria Shipping Co., S.A., 467 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1972); F.
JAMES, supra note 4, at 550; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 47-48 (1942); A. VESTAL,
RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 7-12 (1969).
6. 2 A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 675, at 1422 (1925);
RESTATEMENTS OF JUDGMENTS § 63 (1942).
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defendant is given only one chance to urge any defenses that he
might have to the plaintiff's cause of action.
Common law collateral estoppel is a doctrine of issue preclusion
closely related and in some ways adjunct to the doctrine of res
judicata. It determines the effect of a prior judgment in a subse-
quent suit between the same parties on a different cause of action,7
resulting in a bar to relitigation of any issue actually raised,
litigated, and necessarily decided in the earlier suit.' Thus, the
"might have been pleaded" rule, which requires a party to assert in
the same suit all claims or defenses to a cause of action, does not
supplement collateral estoppel, which applies to a subsequent suit
involving a different cause of action. Consequently, the preclusive ef-
fect of collateral estoppel is narrower than that of res judicata"
The scope of issue and claim preclusion under article 2286 is not
identical to that at commow law. For example, merger and bar are
not recognized in Louisiana." Rather, article 2286 creates a
presumption of correctness in the earlier decision, which applies
when the criteria of article 2286 are met.11 Therefore, the operation
of the article in determining the effect of a prior judgment on a
subsequent suit must be discussed in terms of this presumption and
its applicability.
Whether or not the presumption of correctness will be applied is
determined by the criteria set forth in article 2286, requiring the tri-
ple identity of causes, parties, and demands. The identity of parties
requirement, which has presented little difficulty in interpretation,
refers to an identity of "quality" which is usually, but not always,
physical identity.12 The interpretation of "cause of action," however,
7. A. VESTAL, supra note 5, at 107; Comment, The Louisiana Concept of Res
Judicata, 34 LA. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Louisiana Concept];
Comment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158,
159 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Estoppel].
8. See United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); Tait v.
Western My. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
(1876); F. JAMES. supra note 4, at § 11.19; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
9. See Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. 1978); Dixon,
Booksh & Zimmering, Res Judicata in Louisiana Since Hope v. Madison, 51 TUL. L.
REV. 611, 617-18 (1977); 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 361, at 241 (11th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 54A(2), at
34 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
10. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976).
11. See Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering, supra note 9, at 617-18.
12. See Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 S. 2d 154 (La. 1978); Quinette v.
Delhommer, 247 La. 1121, 176 So. 2d 399 (1965); 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 9, at no.
54A(4). The identity of parties applies most obviously in cases of a "successor" to a
party in the prior litigation. If the second party "stands in the shoes " of the prior par-
ty, he is precluded and bound by a previous judgment. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 9, at
[Vol. 40
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has been more difficult. The current view is that "cause of action,"
as expressed in article 2286, should be read as "cause," which is
analogous to the legal theory of recovery.'8
The proper interpretation of the "thing demanded" is still a mat-
ter of doubt. One leading case held that it is the specific type of
relief demanded." However, this view has been severely criticized.'5
The better view seems to be that it is the type of relief demanded,
but viewed in terms of the basis for the right of indemnification."
For example, in a personal injury suit resulting from an automobile
accident, the type of relief demanded would be money damages to
compensate for the injury resulting from a certain specified act of
negligence by the tortfeasor; the act of negligence serves as the
basis for the plaintiffs right to indemnification.
One of the first cases to consider the effect of collateral estoppel
in Louisiana was State v. American Sugar Refining Co.' The case is
interpreted as expunging all common law notions of res judicata and
collateral estoppel from Louisiana law and establishing the
supremacy of civilian notions as to the effect of a prior judgment on
no. 54A(4). The result would be the same if a tutor brought suit for his ward -a later
suit by the ward for himself would be precluded, but not a suit by the tutor, for
himself, because it involves the same parties, but in different capacities. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2286; 1 R. POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS no. 37, at 581-82 (3d
Am. ed. 1853).
13. Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 S. 2d 287, 291 (La. 1976). Athough the article reads
"cause of action," this was held to be a mistranslation from the French. Id. The proper
translation should be "cause," which the court believed to be closer to "legal theory,"
rather than "claim," which is the common law view. This is generally supported by
civilian doctrine. See 2 M PLANIOL. supra note 9, at no. 54A(3); Comment, Res
Judicata- "Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded, " 2 LA. L. REV. 347, 357-60 (1940).
The general effect of Mitchell has been to eliminate the "might have been pleaded
rule" from Louisiana jurisprudence. See Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering, supra note 9, at
620 n.54. However a problem may arise in determining exactly what cause was advanced
in the prior suit. See Black v. Meadowview Homes, Inc. 201 So. 2d 218 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1967). In Black, the court held that one unsuccessful suit in contract precluded a
later suit based on unjust enrichment. The court justified this result by reasoning that
the cause advanced must be determined by the allegations of fact in the petition. Since
in the first suit the plaintiff advanced sufficient facts to entitle him to seek relief on
the theory of unjust enrichment, the court's refusal to grant the relief requested
precluded further litigation on that cause. This approach seems correct, since articles
1841 and 2164 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure adopt a system of fact pleading
in which a court may award any relief to which the parties are entitled. For further
commentary on this case and its implications, see Louisiana Concept supra note 7, at
772.
14. Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954).
15. For a strong attack, see Louisiana Concept, supra note 7, at 775.
16. Kerameus, Res Judicata: A Foreign Lawyer's Impressions of Some Louisiana
Problems, 35 LA. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1975).
17. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902).
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a subsequent suit. However, it need not be read as prohibiting all
forms of issue preclusion, as will be shown below.
Common law collateral estoppel was first given serious con-
sideration by the Louisiana courts in California Co. v. Price,1 which
established the doctrine in Louisiana jurisprudence.1 The California
Company instituted a concursus proceeding to determine ownership
of oil royalites payable to the lessors of certain mineral rights. The
land upon which the lease was granted was claimed by the state and
also by the Price-Beckwith group, both of which had leased the
mineral rights to the California Company. This was not the first
litigation involving the land in question; in a prior concursus pro-
ceeding,0 the court had held the Price-Beckwith group to be the
owner of the royalties derived from different wells on the same
tract of land, having made the determination that the group actually
owned the land. Relying on the earlier judgment, Price-Beckwith
pleaded res judicata and estoppel. The California Co. court upheld
both, commenting that if res judicata were not available, estoppel
would nevertheless bar relitigation of "every material allegation or
statement made on one side in the prior case, and denied on the
other, which was determined in the course of the proceedings."21
Although the authority for the court's broad statement is
somewhat less than absolute," this case clearly stands for the ex-
istence of issue preclusion in Louisiana, notwithstanding any loose
labelling indicating otherwise. Despite the suggestions of several
18. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957).
19. For a more extensive discussion, see Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering, supra note
9, at 629-30; Collateral Estoppel. supra note 7, at 167-77:
20. California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
21. 234 La. at 350, 99 So. 2d at 747. Although the court referred to this as judicial
estoppel, this form of issue preclusion is more properly referred to as collateral estop-
pel. See Collateral Estoppel, supra note 7, at 168 n.55.
22. The court made a specific reference to Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d
14 (1954). 234 La. at 350, 99 So. 2d at 747. Apparently, the court referred to the discus-
sion in Quarles of Norton v. Crescent City Ice Manufacturing Co., 178 La. 150, 150 So.
859 (1933). However, the court's reference is inaccurate. The problem lies in the
careless use of the term judicial estoppel. The California Co. court used it to refer to
issue preclusion, but the Quarles court used the same phrase to refer to the policy
against the splitting of a cause of action-an entirely different concept. See Collateral
Estoppel, supra note 7, at 168 n.55. The Quarles court was also incorrect in its use of
the term judicial estoppel. That term properly refers to a rule prohibiting parties from
taking inconsistent positions in pleadings filed during the course of, or during subse-
quent, litigation. M. BIGELOW, LAW OF ESTOPPEL lxxxiii, 601 (3d ed. 1882). However, the
references by the court in California Co. to Heroman v. Louisiana Institute, 34 La.
Ann. 805 (1882), and to Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936), is accurate.
These authorities cannot provide more than unsteady support for a civilian theory of
preclusion, since Heroman is founded almost exclusively on common law authorities, 30
La. Ann. at 815, and since Buillard is grounded on Heroman, 169 So. at 86.
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comentators,23 res judicata would not have been applicable in such a
case because the "thing demanded" in each suit was not the same.
The object of the demand in the first suit was the royalties
resulting from the drilling and exploitation of certain wells; the ob-
ject of the demand in the second proceeding was also royalties, but
those resulting from the leasing and drilling of different wells. With
res judicata unavailable, only issue preclusion can justify the Califor-
nia Co. result.2'
After California Co., the lower courts approached the doctrine of
issue preclusion with uncertainty. The doctrine was recognized, but
was rejected as inadequate in many cases.25 Uncertainty over the
continuing validity of California Co. prevented the application of
estoppel in another case, although the circumstances were ideal for
its application. 2 Even the supreme court avoided the opportunity to
make a definitive statement.27
23. See, e.g., Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering, supra note 9, at 629; Collateral Estop-
pel supra note 7, at 169.
24. Kerameus, supra note 16, at 1160.
25. See, e.g., Exhibitors Poster Exch. Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 421
F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1970) (scope of previous judgments held not to apply to later alleged
antitrust violations); Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248 (La. 1975) (compromise held
not to have estoppel effect); Sutterfield v. Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co., 344 So.
2d 1159 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (different issues presented in the subsequent suit);
Miller v. East Ascension Tel. Co., Inc., 331 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (crucial
issue held previously unadjudicated); Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Trans. Corp., 176 So.
2d 692 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (estoppel held to apply only to questions of fact, and not
to questions of law).
26. Bordelon v. Landry, 278 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). In Bordelon, the
parties, drivers injured in an automobile collision, filed suits against each other in dif-
ferent parishes. After Landry received a favorable judgment in his suit, he attempted
to use an estoppel theory to preclude Bordelon's claim, urging that since the first court
had found Bordelon negligent and himself free of negligence, estoppel should apply to
these very same issues in the suit by Bordelon. Since these were the crucial issues in
the case, adoption of Landry's view would have decided the case for him. Unsure about
the continuing vitality of California Co., the court of appeal decided against Landry,
hoping that on appeal the supreme court would take this opportunity to settle the
estoppel question once and for all; however, no action was taken on the case by the
supreme court.
27. Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976). In Mitchell the first suit was to
cancel a purchase option, on the grounds of nonpayment and lesion; the second suit
was to cancel the same option on grounds of fraud and lack of consideration. Justice
Dixon, speaking for the majority, used a purely common law theory of collateral estop-
pel, and attempted to mesh with it a purely civilian theory of "cause." Finding the
result wanting, he rejected application of the doctrine. Id. at 290. In so doing, the court
avoided the real issue at hand. What was being requested was not a mechanical ap-
plication of a common law version of collateral estoppel, but preclusion of certain
issues decided in the prior suit between the parties. A doctrine of issue preclusion
must be fitted to the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata) which it supplements.
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In the area of family law, issue preclusion was clearly recognized
in Fulmer v. Fulmer.2 In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that once fault is litigated in proceedings for separation from
bed and board, it may not be relitigated in later alimony pro-
ceedings. In order to reach this result, the court relied on an inter-
pretation of article 160 of the Civil Code,' rather than relying ex-
plicitly on collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, the actual effect is one
of issue preclusion: the judgment in one case is determinative of
issues in another case, although the thing demanded in each is clear-
ly different (judgment of separation versus alimony payments)."
In the instant case, the plaintiff woodcutter, injured in the
course of his employment while on the land of Crown Zellerbach, filed
suit for workmen's compensation benefits. Plaintiff's immediate
employer, subcontractor Carpenter, and the alleged contractor,
Robert Campbell, Inc., were named as defendants. The alleged
statutory employer, Crown Zellerbach, was not joined. Judgment
was rendered in favor of plaintiff against both defendants. Only
Campbell appealed, and the appeal was successful.8'
Subsequently, Welch filed suit against Crown Zellerbach, alleg-
ing that as statutory employer, Crown Zellerbach owed workmen's
compensation benefits to plaintiff as a result of the injury.2 Crown
Zellerbach filed a peremptory exception of prescription, alleging
first, that an interruption of prescription could only have occurred if
Crown Zellerbach and Carpenter were solidarily liable, and second,
that a finding of solidary liability required the existence of a subcon-
tractor/contractor relationship between Crown Zellerbach and Camp-
bell, as well as between Carpenter and Campbell. Since the ap-
pellate court had previously decided there was no such relationship
between Campbell and Carpenter, the disirict court held that
relitigation of the relationship issue was precluded and sustained
the peremptory exceptions of prescription, peremption, and res
judicata. The court of appeal affirmed on the basis of peremption
without reaching the plea of res judicata, thus giving preclusive ef-
fect to the former judgment."
In reversing, the supreme court appears to have negated entire-
ly the existence of any sort of issue preclusion in Louisiana. It must
28. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
29. Id. at 625.
30. See Collateral Estoppel, supra note 7, at 169 n.59.
31. Welch v. Robert Campbell, Inc., 316 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 321 So. 2d 523 (La. 1975). The court held that Welch failed to establish an
employer-employee relationship between himself and Campbell which, of course,
precluded Welch's workman's compensation recovery.
32. LA. R.S. 23:1061 (1950).
33. 351 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
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be noted that this case was not an ideal one for the application of
estoppel or preclusion, as the element of mutuality was not present.
The doctrine of mutuality 4 holds that estoppel exists only between
the original parties to the action and may not be asserted by any
others. Although this doctrine has fallen into decline in recent years,
it still retains some vitality." Since Crown Zellerbach was not a par-
ty to the action between Campbell and Welch, which resulted in a
finding that Campbell was not liable, it can be argued that Crown
Zellerbach could not obtain any benefit from the decision."
Although the court discusses only common law collateral estop-
pel, the opinion seems opposed to the idea of preclusion of issues in
any form; the court comments that "collateral estoppel is a doctrine
of issue preclusion alien to Louisiana law."87 The court notes that
"cause" under 2286 and "cause of action" in the common law have
different meanings and concludes from this that collateral estoppel
"is not susceptible of an orderly application in a jurisdiction utilizing
civil law terminology."" The logic behind this statement is nowise
clear; the basic idea of issue preclusion is not alien to either system
and, as will be seen, is probably susceptible to more convenient use
in Louisiana than in the common law jurisdictions.
The court further states that the adoption of collateral estoppel
would "subvert" the ideal of the "ancient legislation.""' The court
draws a specific conclusion as to the intent of the redactors in draft-
ing article 2286: since the Code defines res judicata in such narrow
terms, the legislators must have preferred relitigation to erroneous
perpetuation of incorrect judicial decisions. The adoption of an
"issue preclusion device" broadening the operation of res judicata
would, therefore, subvert this ideal. °
34. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of American Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Valentine, 119 Cal. App. 2d 125,
259 P.2d 70 (1953); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral EstoppeL Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Collateral Estoppel, supra note 7 at 162.
35. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L.
REV. 301 (1961). For information regarding the states which have abandoned the
mutuality requirement, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1067-77 (1970).
36. However, it would appear that the logic that provided the foundation for Bern-
hard would apply in Louisiana. See note 33, supra. In Muntz v. Algiers & Gretna
Street Railway Co., 116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906), the court held that a judgment in
favor of the defendant lessee would protect the defendants from subsequent suits by
the unsuccessful plaintiff. But see Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919
(1960). The current doctrine seems to favor the Muntz view (i.e., that parties primarily
and derivatively liable for a debt are the same). See Dixon, Booksh & Zimmering,
supra note 9, at 619.
37. 359 So. 2d at 156.
38. Id. at 157.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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The court erroneously relies upon the intent of the redactors as
a foundation for its opinion. As an eminent authority on civilian
jurisprudence, Professor Kerameus, has pointed out, issue preclu-
sion was unknown at the time Civil Code article 2286 was enacted.'
Therefore, an investigation of the exact purpose of the legislators
with respect to issue preclusion is fruitless. Furthermore, it is sub-
mitted that the court is incorrect when it states that any sort of
issue preclusion is alien to Louisiana law; a workable form of issue
preclusion can be achieved, while violating neither the letter, nor
the spirit of article 2286.
In many commentaries concerning article 2286, emphasis has
been placed upon the second sentence of the article, while the first
sentence, equally important, has been slighted. As a result, the
courts have a firm idea as to when to apply the presumption of cor-
rectness (when the identities are met) but are less certain as to
what it should be applied. The courts conceive of the first sentence
as restricting the application of article 2286 to entire suits or claims
only, such that either everything is precluded (res judicata) or
nothing is precluded. It is submitted that if the underlying rationale
of the article is the presumption of correctness accorded the find-
ings of the previous court, then the presumption should apply when-
ever the triple identities of the article are satisfied. Issues within
suits may be the same, although the suits themselves bear no more
than a superficial similarity.
The current court approach is reminiscent of the common law
concepts of merger and bar, which address themselves to the claim
and not to the individual issues within the suit. It appears that the
courts have been attempting to apply the civilian method while
possessed of a common law mind-set. The result has been an un-
necessarily restricted scope of preclusion. The authority of the
"thing adjuged" extends to that which was the "object of the judg-
ment"; it is submitted that the "object of the judgment" may com-
prehend many things, implicit as well as explicit.
The French, operating under similar constraints, have evolved a
practical and workable method for issue preclusion, one that the
Louisiana courts could adopt without much difficulty. French
jurisprudence does not restrict the application of res judicata to the
41. This point was made by Professor Kerameus in a letter to the author dated
December 12, 1978.
42. Furthermore, the phrasing of the court's opinion creates the suspicion that it
divined the legislative intent through its own interpretation of article 2286, then pur-
portedly arrived at an interpretation of article 2286 through its comprehension of the
legislator's intent. This circuitous process is highly suspect.
[Vol. 40
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entire suit. Rather, distinctions within the grounds of the decisions
are not barred. 8 The guiding purpose is to search for implied
judgments on questions prdjudicielle, i.e., issues necessarily iden-
tified in the course of the first suit." When the three identities are
met in such an instance, the specific issue pr4judicielle is precluded
from further litigation. 5 The purpose of French Civil Code article
1351 is to ensure that the questions prdjudicielle are actually iden-
tical, that they have more than a superficial similarity. These issues,
then, are treated almost as suits within suits-subdemands related
to the major demand of the entire suit. By dwelling on the real
scope of the previous judgment, the courts arrive at issue preclu-
sion, without specifically employing that term.
An examination of relevant Louisiana jurisprudence reveals that
the ideal evolved by the French is not as unknown to our
jurisprudence as the court contends. The res judicata effect of im-
plied judgments on questions prdjudicielle has often been obliquely
suggested in Louisiana opinions addressing the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, but there has not been a clear state-
ment on the application of the underlying theory in Louisiana. The
most notable suggestion was propounded by Justice Provosty in the
form of two hypotheticals in the crucial majority opinion of State v.
American Sugar Refining Co." In the second hypothetical, 8 which is
the clearer of the two, Justice Provosty considers the case of a
defendant destroying a plaintiff neighbor's fence. In the resulting
43. See Kerameus, supra note 16, at 1162.
44. Id
45. See, e.g., Judgment of 13 juin 1966, Cass. civ., D.1966.J.714; Judgment of 19
mai 1965, Cass. ch. reun, D.1965.J.461 note Laroque; Judgment of 21 Nov. 1899, Cass.
req., D.1900.1.18. 12 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 769, at 334-35 (6th ed.
1958); 1 G. RIPERT ET J. BOULANGER, TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL D'APRtS LE TRAITk DE
PLANIOL nos 744-45 (1956).
46. Kerameus, supra note 16, at 1159.
47. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902). The case involved the state's attempted
recovery of certain license taxes, imposed on the sugar refiners of the state, for the
years 1900-1902. In an earlier case involving these parties, American Sugar had raised
the defense of exemption, citing a constitutional article exempting "manufacturers"
from all license fees. In the first case, the issue was decided in favor of the state,
holding that American Sugar was a refiner, and not a manufacturer of sugar. When
the second case arose in 1908, American Sugar raised the same defense. In denying
the state's request for preclusion of this defense, the court noted that American
Sugar's business had changed in the intervening years. Therefore, a new question of
law was presented to the court, i e., whether the new activities constituted "manufac-
ture" within the constitutional exemption. Since this was a question of law, and not of
fact, preclusion was not available. Id. at 607, 32 So. at 966.
48. However, the first is also worthy of note. Here, Justice Provosty hypothecates
two suits for installments of interest on the same note. "Immediate payment of the
capital would not be demanded, but its recognition as a debt would necessarily con-
stitute the main demand of the suit. Interest would follow as a mere consequence." Id.
at 608, 32 So. at 967 (emphasis added). Kerameus comments:
1979]
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suit, the defendant pleads the existence of a contract allowing him
to destroy the fence, a defense that is rejected by the court. If the
defendant breaks the fence again, Provosty properly concludes that
res judicata would not apply to the suit. However, he feels that res
judicata would apply to the contract defense. "[Tihe reason would be
that while urged as a defense, this claim of right would in reality be
a demand brought by way of reconvention. The defendant should,
pro hac vice, have ceased to be a defendant, and become a
plaintiff."'"
Kerameus comments that Provosty's ingenious but wholly ar-
tificial construction, raising a defense to the status of an indepen-
dent suit, is really nothing more than issue preclusion of precisely
the type explained previously." In California Co., the court embraced
the concept of issue preclusion by declaring the issue of title to the
property to be an incident of the previous litigation, which was
necessarily decided by the court in that case. 1
The mechanics of the civilian method of issue preclusion can pro-
bably be best understood by examining its application in the two
suits involved in the California Co. litigation. (See chart below for a
diagrammatic presentation.)
ISSUE A (ROYALTIES)
California Co. I California Co. II
Parties: State, Price-Beckwith State, Price-Beckwith
Object: to be declared owner of to be declared owner of
rental monies due on wells rental monies due on wells
drilled pre-1951 drilled post-1951
Cause: valid lease to California Co. valid lease to California Co.
ISSUE B (LEASE)
California Co. I California Co. II
Parties: State, Price-Beckwith State, Price-Beckwith
Object: to be recognized as valid to be recognized as valid
lessor under pre-1951 leases lessor under post-1951 leases
This perception of (1) the party's actual request as a mere consequence, and (2)
the inquiry into necessary (even if only implied) presuppositions of the actual de-
mand, as falling within the binding effect of the judgment, is precisely what ex-
ceeds normal res judicata; according to European terminology, this would move
into the vast area of preliminary questions being estopped by the judgment.
Kerameus, supra note 16, at 1160.
49. 108 La. at 613, 32 So. at 969.
50. Kerameus, supra note 16, at 1161.
51. 234 La. at 350, 99 So. 2d at 746-47.
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Cause: ownership of land and
formalities observed
ownership of land and
formalities observed
ISSUE C (LAND QUESTION)
California Co. I
Parties: State, Price-Beckwith
Object: to be recognized owner of
the disputed land upon
which the wells stand
Cause: Price-Beckwith claims valid
sale from state and state




to be recognized owner of
the disputed land upon
which the wells stand
Price-Beckwith claims valid
sale from state and state
claims ownership of land
through dominion
ISSUE D (FORMALITIES QUESTION)
California Co. I
State, Price-Beckwith
to recognize the validity
of the form of the leases




to recognize the validity
of the form of the leases
covering wells drilled after
1951
Cause: formalities observed in the formalities observed in the
confection of the leases confection of the leases
It is readily apprehended that each issue addressed in the first
suit raised incidental issues, the resolution of which was a prereq-
uisite to the adjudication of the primary issues. The suit itself,
which sought to determine ownership of certain royalties for specific
wells, necessarily raised the question of the validity of individual
leases. The question of the validity of those leases, in turn, was
determined by the resolution of other issues, such as the ownership
of the land and the observation of the proper formalities. Since it
was necessary to consider and resolve these concomitant issues in
the previous case, each issue should be considered an object of the
judgment and, therefore, should be accorded preclusive effect if raised
in a subsequent case. The purpose of the triple identity of article
2286, to ensure that the issues are indeed the same, is thereby
satisfied.
If the court were to employ the civilian method of issue preclu-
sion in considering the California Co. case, it would initially compare
each issue in the first suit with those in the second suit to deter-




LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
issues. For example, it may be seen that the royalty issue (issue A)
in each case does not fully correspond. Although the parties and the
causes-the legal theories asserted in the case-are identical, the
wells (elements necessary to the object of each suit) from which the
royalties are demanded are not the same since they were drilled
pursuant to different leases. Therefore, article 2286 cannot apply to
preclude relitigation of issue A. Similarly, in issues B and D, the
parties and causes are identical; however, since each case deals with
different wells, the objects of the demands are not the same. In
California Co. I, the two litigants are demanding that the court
recognize as valid leases executed by them before 1951; in California
Co. II, the parties are demanding that the court recognize as valid
leases executed by them after that date.
However, it is evident that issue C is the same in both cases.
The three identities match perfectly because the land involved is
the same. If the court finds that this issue was necessarily decided
in the first case (as it was, since one cannot grant a lease on proper
ty one does not own), it should be considered an object of the judg-
ment; and, as such, further consideration of the issue is precluded.
The purpose of the triple identity of article 2286, to ensure that the
issues are indeed the same, is satisfied. The conclusion is that after
the original decision, the Price-Beckwith group had every reason to
believe it had the authority necessary to execute leases on the
disputed property.
Since the Welch opinion is, for the most part, carefully couched
in terms such as "common law" collateral estoppel, it need not be
wholly repudiated in order to adopt the civilian method of issue
preclusion. A broadened understanding and application of the terms
"authority of the thing adjudged" and "object of the judgment" is
all that is necessary. Such an approach would save valuable court
time, maintain the integrity of the prior judgment, and promote cer-
tainty for the parties.
Dennis K. Dolbear
INSANITY, INTENT, AND HOMEOWNER'S LIABILITY
The husband, defendant's insured, fatally shot his wife and com-
mitted suicide. The wife's parents brought a direct action against
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